Introduction

The election on 9 October 2004 gave the Howard government a commanding majority in the House of Representatives and control of the Senate from 1 July 2005.¹ As a result, the government was able to frame legislation that did not require the support of minor parties.

Freedom from the constraints of negotiating with the Senate crossbench emboldened Cabinet to continue with the complete sale of Telstra. Cabinet also embarked on a comprehensive reform of industrial relations laws while continuing with reforms already initiated in health, aged care, social welfare and education. However, this proved to be a two-edged sword. While sweeping industrial changes passed the Senate with ease, they also created a platform on which a resurgent Labor Party and trade unions could successfully campaign for a change of government.²

Industrial relations and employment services

In March 2005 Kevin Andrews, Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, sought Cabinet’s agreement on the broad strategic direction for workplace relations reform. The minimum wages safety net, he argued, was not genuine and agreement-making was costly and cumbersome. To remedy these deficiencies, he suggested reforms that would encourage a more direct relationship between employers and employees and reduce unnecessary regulation.³

Andrews’s proposed workplace reforms were based on the Constitution’s corporations power, which allowed for the direct exercise of Commonwealth powers, rather than on the conciliation and arbitration power, which could only be exercised through an intermediary such as the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC).⁴

On 30 March 2005 Cabinet requested an additional option for a ‘simplified, statutorily based “no disadvantage test”’ (NDT), a provision that required that workers be no worse off under agreements compared to any relevant award or law.⁵ A few weeks later, on 22 April 2005, Cabinet noted a further presentation by Andrews and authorised him to bring forward a submission establishing an alternative mechanism for setting and establishing minimum wages and conditions, simplifying agreement-making and introducing a unified national workplace relations system.⁶

The result of these deliberations was Howard’s May 2005 notification to parliament of the government’s intention to introduce a Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Bill intended to amend the Workplace Relations Act 1996. The reform package approved by Cabinet sought to replace separate state and federal industrial relations systems with a unified national system, known as WorkChoices. Once passed, the new Act would come into effect on 27 March 2006.⁷

This new system dispensed with unfair dismissal laws for companies under a certain size, replaced the NDT with a much more limited safety net of 5 conditions that could be bargained away and required workers to submit their certified agreements directly to the Workplace Authority, a new statutory agency, rather than go through the AIRC. The new system also restricted trade union power by adjusting the workers’ ability to strike legally and by enabling them to bargain for conditions without collectivised representation.⁸

The new legislation sparked a major campaign of resistance and defence of the rights of employees that was led by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), the peak association for Australian trade unions. The ACTU’s campaign, ‘Your Rights at Work’, would play a significant role in the Howard government’s defeat in the 2007 federal election.⁹

Cabinet also approved an extension of arrangements to outsource job placement services that had been pursued since 1998 via Job Network, a national network established in May 1998 to replace the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES). Job Network comprised contracted private and community organisations that assisted unemployed people on income support, particularly the long-term unemployed, to find work.

Between the introduction of the Active Participation Model in July 2003 and April 2005, over 1.1 million jobseekers had received Job Network Services with over 800,000 job placements. Peter Dutton, Minister for Workforce Participation, proposed the extension of Job Network contracts from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2009 as well as purchasing processes for complementary employment programs.¹⁰

The sale of Telstra and the creation of the Future Fund

The government’s 2004 election victory made it easier for it to sell its remaining stake in Australia’s formerly government-owned telecommunications company, Telstra (previously Telecom Australia). Immediately after the election, Cabinet agreed to commission a scoping study for the possible sale of the government’s stake in Telstra Corporation Limited. By 16 August 2005 Cabinet was ready to agree that the government should aim for either a full sale of its remaining 51.8 per cent shareholding or, more probably, a significant partial sale (with any residual shareholding placed in the government’s proposed Future Fund).¹¹

Ministers had announced the establishment of such a fund during the 2004 federal election campaign.¹² Its purpose was to fund superannuation schemes for public servants and defence personnel. This was a significant ambition as the government’s unfunded superannuation liability was valued at $88 billion on 30 June 2004. At that time, payments to superannuants were being made from current revenue. Treasurer Peter Costello and Nick Minchin, Minister for Finance and Administration, proposed that future surpluses be used to build a dedicated asset to offset the liability.¹³ They proposed establishing an appropriately qualified board to manage the Future Fund, assisted by a new statutory agency and with investment activities outsourced to private sector fund managers.¹⁴

Immigration

The immigration portfolio received significant attention from Cabinet in 2005 as problems in the treatment of dual nationals came to light. One of these concerned Cornelia Rau, a dual German and Australian citizen who had been unlawfully detained for 10 months in 2004–05 as part of the Australian Government’s mandatory detention program.¹⁵ On 9 February 2005 Amanda Vanstone, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, announced that former Australian Federal Police (AFP) Commissioner Mick Palmer would be conducting an inquiry into Rau’s detention. This was later expanded to investigate the wrongful deportation of another dual national, Vivian Solon, to the Philippines.¹⁶

Palmer’s report, released on 14 July 2005, severely criticised the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA). In July the government appointed Andrew Metcalfe as departmental secretary and asked the Commonwealth Ombudsman to complete investigations into Solon’s case as well as those of 200 other detainees subsequently found to be Australian citizens.¹⁷ The government also agreed on a plan to respond to Palmer’s findings based on the need for broad cultural change in DIMIA in relation to leadership, governance, training, client service, openness, quality assurance, values and behaviour.¹⁸

When considering the 2005 Migration (Non-Humanitarian) Program, Cabinet agreed to set up a Working Group comprising the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Finance and Administration (Finance), DIMIA, and the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations to advise on the extent to which the Migration Program could better target skills shortages.

On 24 March 2005 the Working Group reported that the Migration Program could be improved by employer-sponsored entry, by directly helping employers in key industries and by pressing the states to speed up processes for licensing trades occupations.¹⁹ Because some state and territory governments had been slow to begin sponsoring skilled migrants, Vanstone proposed that the shortfall in the projected 2004–05 non-humanitarian intake be used to meet excess demand in areas such as South Australia’s recruitment of British police officers.²⁰ Cabinet also increased the Humanitarian Program to 13,000 places in 2004–05, a move welcomed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, refugee advocates and various non-government organisations.²¹

On 22 March 2005 Cabinet authorised Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Vanstone to negotiate an extension until 2007 of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the governments of Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Nauru on their Offshore Processing Centres (OPC) for cooperation in the management of asylum seekers.²² To strengthen border control and keep refugee protection cases out of the Australian court system, these OPCs had been established in Nauru in September 2002 and on PNG’s Manus Island in October 2001.²³

In June Cabinet agreed on a package of assistance for Nauru in 2005–09 to ensure the effective functioning of the OPC there. The primary purpose of the assistance measures was to ensure the OPC’s effective operation by supporting the provision of essential services. Nauru’s power services and water supplies were only possible because of the Australian aid program, and its hospital depended on Australian supplies and management support.²⁴

Health, aged care, education and social welfare

Overarching themes in policy in these policy areas were to rein in government expenditure, shift people from welfare to work, restore a ‘balance’ between Medicare and private health insurance, and address skills shortages by providing students with vocational training in schools.²⁵

In 2005 Costello became concerned about the generosity of medical rebates paid to families under the Medicare safety net. In identifying savings in the post-election Budget, he noted how, over 4 years, the cost had spiralled from an estimated $440 million to more than $1 billion.²⁶

This concern prompted him to collaborate with Nick Minchin, Minister for Finance and Administration, and Tony Abbott, Minister for Health and Ageing, on a submission to increase the safety net thresholds to restore the original concept of the safety net ‘as a form of “disaster insurance” for people who incurred significant out-of-pocket medical expenses within a short period of time due to an unexpected acute illness or injury and protection for patients who suffer from a chronic illness’.²⁷

As a result of negotiation with independent senators in 2003, the annual thresholds had been negotiated such that over 10 per cent of people were eligible for the safety net. A consequence of the 2005 change approved by Cabinet was that it broke an election promise made by Abbott in 2004 that the government would not increase Medicare safety net thresholds.²⁸ Responding to loud calls for his resignation over this broken promise, Abbott pointed out that economic responsibility was the government’s overriding priority.²⁹ In a related submission, Abbott provided Cabinet with options for improving the incentive for Australians to take out and retain private health insurance in the face of increasing cost pressures and rising premiums.³⁰

The Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) was a significant government program. Costing around $6 billion per year, it remained the fastest growing component of the health Budget: over the previous decade, overall growth had been running at 12 per cent per annum. Cabinet supported a proposal from 3 departments – PM&C, Finance and Treasury – for a review of the PBS scheme that would begin in the second half of 2005 and report to Cabinet in November with recommendations to enhance the scheme’s effectiveness and sustainability.³¹ Changes to the PBS were announced in 2006, to take effect progressively from July 2007.³²

In a related submission, Abbott and Ian Macfarlane, Minister for Industry, Tourism and Resources, submitted a package of measures to encourage greater use of generic medicines. This had the potential to put downward pressure on the cost of the PBS by encouraging competition among the manufacturers of generic medicines to list PBS medicines at reduced prices.³³ In another submission, Abbott received Cabinet approval to add a new item in the Medical Benefits Schedule (MBS) to improve access to counselling and advice services by women who were or had recently been pregnant.³⁴

Longer-term Cabinet submissions in the health portfolio were concerned with Australia’s preparedness for future influenza pandemics and the risk that H5N1 avian influenza could mutate into a virus easily transmissible to humans, leading to a global pandemic.³⁵ (Such a pandemic would later confront Scott Morrison’s government in 2020–22.³⁶)

Howard’s government had encouraged rapid growth of the provision of private aged care by large private corporations and the deregulation of nursing homes. In 2004 it had commissioned a review of the aged care sector by Sydney economist Professor Warren Hogan.³⁷ Julie Bishop, Minister for the Ageing, recommended that Cabinet agree to the immediate release of a discussion paper that canvassed reforms such as improving the fairness of aged care fees and harmonising the arrangements governing fees in aged care more closely with those that applied to the aged care pension.³⁸

The paper also discussed reforms such as introducing accommodation bonds into high-care residential aged care and means-testing care fees. PM&C noted that these reforms were likely to be controversial, that their effects were not fully explored and that they possibly created a ‘perverse incentive for people to remain in hospital where they have access to free care, rather than opting for community care or residential aged care services’.³⁹ On 12 December 2005, therefore, Cabinet declined to agree to the submission’s recommendations and asked Bishop to prepare a paper, in consultation with other ministers, for a Cabinet strategic meeting in early 2006.⁴⁰

During the 2004 election campaign the Coalition had promised to establish 24 Australian Technical Colleges (ATC) for up to 7,200 Year 11 and 12 students. After the election, the initiative was put before a Special Expenditure Review Committee, which approved funding of $350.8 million between FY2004–05 and FY2008–09.⁴¹

The government envisaged that the ATCs would strengthen the economy by meeting increased demands for skilled trades workers. In July 2005 Cabinet agreed to increase the number of ATCs to 25 and endorsed the Department of Education, Science and Training’s assessment of initial proposals to establish and operate them. The ATC program ceased on 31 December 2009 after the Rudd Labor government withdrew its funding.⁴²

On 1 July 2000 the Australian Government had introduced A New Tax System including Family Tax Benefits (FTB) to help families. For low-income families especially, FTB could represent 44 per cent of their disposable income. The need for some families to estimate their income a year in advance meant, however, that they might be overpaid for their entitlements. Costello, Minchin, and Kay Patterson, Minister for Family and Community Services, and Joe Hockey, Minister for Human Services, prepared a package of measures to help families reduce FTB overpayments.⁴³

In a related submission, Patterson sought Cabinet approval for a national agenda for early childhood education.⁴⁴ This recognised research pointing to links between investment in early years of life and completing school and gaining employment, reducing reliance on welfare and staying out of jail.⁴⁵

Not long after the establishment of the Department of Human Services in 2004, a plan emerged to explore the use of a ‘smart card’ for citizens dealing with Human Services agencies. Access to most Human Services payments still relied on paper or electronic forms filled in by person or by phone. Hockey proposed that a smart card would enable citizens to carry a secure set of ‘electronic keys’ to facilitate easier access to government benefits and services.⁴⁶ A variant of this idea would later be introduced as a social policy instrument in the Howard government’s Northern Territory intervention that began in August 2007.⁴⁷

Attorney-General Philip Ruddock proposed a package of reforms to the family law system; this came in response to a House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs report of its inquiry into child custody arrangements in cases of family separation. Ruddock’s proposals sought to promote the involvement of both parents in their children’s lives, ameliorate the impact of conflict on children and reduce the emotional costs to families of relationship breakdown and separation. The reforms included a network of 654 Family Relationship Centres supported by the expansion of other services to prevent separation, such as pre-marriage counselling and family relationship education. They included changes to the law to encourage shared parental responsibility, introduce compulsory dispute resolution and support the involvement both parents in their children’s lives.⁴⁸

Foreign affairs, defence, trade and national security

The tsunami that devastated countries in the Indian Ocean region on 26 December 2004 resulted in an estimated 290,000 deaths, including 19 Australians. It also displaced 1.5 million people, with thousands injured or missing. More than $9 billion had been pledged in assistance to tsunami-affected countries.⁴⁹

The tsunami was discussed at a Special Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Leaders’ Meeting in Jakarta on 6 January 2005 where Prime Minister John Howard undertook that Australia would ‘do its bit’ towards efforts to establish a tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean (IOTWS).⁵⁰ To that end, his ministers later brought forward a cross-portfolio submission covering the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Bureau of Meteorology, Geoscience Australia and Energy Management Australia at a cost of $36.4 million over 4 years and additional running costs of $8.1 million per annum from FY2009–10.⁵¹

Indonesia had a particularly pressing need for reconstruction assistance. By providing such aid quickly and effectively, Australia was provided a ‘one-off opportunity to lay the groundwork for a new and broadly based component of the relationship’ between Australian and Indonesia.⁵² Cabinet reached the decision in February 2005 that $1 billion be appropriated for the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) to deliver relief and rehabilitation by focusing on areas of Sumatra.⁵³ One of the challenges of the Australia–Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development was that Aceh, one of the most devastated areas, was a conflict zone with a significant history of human rights abuses.⁵⁴

By the middle of 2005, with the support of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a leader well-disposed towards Australia, and with aid already beginning to flow to Indonesia, Australia found itself in the best position in more than a decade to strengthen a bilateral relationship that had been damaged by the consequences of East Timor’s separation from Indonesia in 1999.⁵⁵ In June 2005 Cabinet agreed to Downer’s recommendations to develop a trade investment framework and overarching bilateral security framework agreement, and to expand cooperation in defence and in combating terrorism and people-smuggling.⁵⁶

2005 was a critical year for the extension of Australia’s commitment to Afghanistan. In July Cabinet’s National Security Committee (NSC) approved a recommendation from Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, for an Australian defence contribution to the reconstruction of Afghanistan.⁵⁷ Australia had previously made a military contribution to US-led operations in Afghanistan in 2001–02 through the deployment of Special Air Service (SAS) elements. In December 2002 the SAS Task Force was withdrawn.⁵⁸

In the context of a resurgent Taliban in 2004, the US Central Command requested that Australia consider deploying special forces to the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer also raised the possibility of a further defence contribution when he visited Australia in March–April 2005.⁵⁹ By then, the situation in Afghanistan, where trade in narcotics was pervasive, was volatile and some feared that a failed state could recreate an environment in which transnational terrorism could flourish. Hill advised the NSC that an appropriately based Australian contribution ‘may enhance our already strong relationships with the US and the United Kingdom, and develop our relationship with NATO’.⁶⁰

The NSC agreed to Hill’s submission to deploy a Special Forces Task Group (SFTG) to operate for up to 12 months from September 2005 conditional as a component of the US-led Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, within the Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan.⁶¹

The NSC subsequently agreed that the SFTG would conduct operations primarily in the Uruzgan and Dai Kundi provinces and that an aviation element be added to improve the coalition’s rotary wing-based mobility and support capabilities.⁶² The SAS would stay for years in what became 20 rotations, involving 3,000 personnel, while Australia’s mission also grew with a ‘Reconstruction Task Force’ deployed in 2006 to Uruzgan province.⁶³

The Australian military justice system would later be involved in investigating allegations of war crimes committed by Australian special forces personnel in Afghanistan between 2005 and 2016. Proposals to reform Australia’s military justice system were the subject of a 2005 Cabinet submission from Hill (after a 2003 Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee inquiry). Hill’s proposed changes sought to balance the maintenance of effective discipline with the protection of the rights of individuals. The reforms included replacing courts-martial with an Australian Military Court independent of chains of command and setting up a joint Australian Defence Force (ADF) investigations unit.⁶⁴

Australia’s close political and economic relationship with Japan had much to do with the Cabinet agreeing to an Australian military contingent replacing Dutch forces in providing a secure environment for the Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group that was operating in the Al Muthanna province in southern Iraq.⁶⁵ To prevent the possibility of strategic failure in Iraq and violence spreading through the Middle East, Hill recommended that Australia support an approach of isolating the insurgency in Iraq from its basis of support among the local population.⁶⁶

The increasing tempo of the Iraq insurgency was highlighted in May 2005 when Australian engineer Douglas Wood was kidnapped by insurgents.⁶⁷ In response, Howard stated that Australia would neither pull troops out nor pay any ransom.⁶⁸ Six weeks later, Wood was rescued by Iraqi troops with assistance from US forces.⁶⁹

In 2005 the NSC decided to review regularly Australia’s military commitment in Iraq and to consider options for an Australian contribution to a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan.⁷⁰ The allied intervention in Iraq of 2003 had damaged both the United States and the United Nations, whose secretary-general was anxious to improve its relevance and performance at the UN Summit held in New York on 14–16 September.⁷¹

Of the many defence-related submissions considered by Cabinet, one was an agreement on 15 August to continue the long-standing policy of excluding women from army positions involving direct combat roles but to provide greater opportunities for suitably qualified women to serve in a wider variety of non-combat support positions.⁷² Another concerned the arming of Australian Customs Service vessels undertaking operations dealing with drugs, people smuggling, counterterrorism and illegal fishing.⁷³

Still another important defence submission concerned the Defence Capability Plan (DCP). On 12 April 2005 Cabinet agreed to establish an interdepartmental committee to report to the NSC on options for delivering the government’s agreed DCP, a detailed, costed 10-year plan comprising a project that aimed to ensure Australia had a balanced force that could achieve the capability goals identified in the 2000 Defence White Paper.⁷⁴

In his Defence Budget submission, Hill included new measures totalling $410.1 million and brought forward $300 million from later years into FY2005–06 to reflect changed DCP costs. The new spending included security and counterterrorism initiatives, such as ‘Securing Australia’s North West Shelf’.⁷⁵ A noteworthy defence procurement submission was for MoU for negotiations on Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) production, sustainment and development.⁷⁶ Australia had signed on to the JSF project in 2002 to replace the ageing fleet of F-111 and F/A-18 fighter jets.⁷⁷

In November 2005 Hill asked the NSC to approve Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2005.⁷⁸ The update reaffirmed the threat of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and urged the development of ADF capability to meet such threats. PM&C, however, opposed the release of the update because ‘it is suggested that the government is more willing to contemplate substantial, rather than niche or specialist contributions to US-led coalitions and that the ADF should support this proposed policy with a wider range of policy options including at the upper end’.⁷⁹

Terrorist bombings perpetrated by mainly locally born and raised young Muslims in London in July 2005, as well as terrorist bombings in Bali in October 2005, highlighted the potential for radicalisation of elements of Muslim communities in culturally diverse Western societies.⁸⁰ Accordingly, John Cobb, Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, sought Cabinet’s approval for cross-portfolio initiatives to support a national action plan to address threats to Australia’s social cohesion and security for the period from FY2006–07 to FY2009–10.⁸¹ Counterterrorist arrangements were also the subject of Council of Australian Governments (COAG) discussions.⁸²

Another national security submission related to telecommunications and concerned Tony Blunn’s review of regulation of access to communications under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. Blunn’s principal recommendation was to establish overarching legislation for access to telecommunications that boosted the law enforcement and security agency capacity while providing a single framework to protect the privacy of users of telecommunications services.⁸³

In trade affairs, the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations launched in 2001 had stalled since the ministerial conference in Cancún, Mexico, in 2003. This meant that free trade agreements assumed even greater importance in Australian trade policy.⁸⁴ On 12 April 2005 Cabinet authorised that an announcement of the commencement of Free Trade Agreement negotiations with the Chinese government be made during Howard’s visit to China in April 2005.⁸⁵ Australia would have to work hard to assuage Chinese concerns about the negative effect of improved access for Australian goods and particularly agriculture and services.⁸⁶ In a related submission, Downer received Cabinet approval to proceed with negotiations on a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement for the export of uranium to China for peaceful purposes.⁸⁷

In the Pacific region, Downer advised the NSC that the scale of the institutional weaknesses in Papua New Guinea (PNG) ‘were so great that the solutions may, in some cases, be beyond the ECP [Enhanced Cooperation Program]’.⁸⁸ In 2003 Cabinet had agreed on a new interventionist approach in PNG – the ECP that involved the deployment by 2005 of 126 Australian police and 37 officials to assist with governance, public sector capacity-building and law-and-order challenges.

On 13 May 2005 PNG’s Supreme Court ruled key aspects of the Act establishing the ECP as inconsistent with its constitution. The ruling had the effect of removing the legal basis for Australian police to exercise police powers in PNG and of exposing those deployed under the ECP to both criminal liability and PNG civil jurisdiction. As the PNG government was unwilling to amend their constitution to resolve problems for the ECP, Downer’s solution was to secure Cabinet’s agreement to bring ECP employees under the bilateral aid program but not to reduce the number of deployed officials.⁸⁹

Meanwhile, in Fiji, divisions between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians had deepened to the point where the ‘middle ground’ had evaporated.⁹⁰ These divisions, Downer reported, had been exacerbated by the dispute between the Fijian government and Commodore Frank Bainimarama, Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces, over a Bill that sought to give amnesty to those involved in the 2000 coup against Mahendra Chaudry, the country’s Indo-Fijian prime minister.⁹¹ Political and ethnic divisions, fuelled by the decline in the sugar and textile, clothing and footwear industries, eventually prompted Bainimarama to instigate a 2006 coup that raised him to the prime ministership the following year.

Elsewhere, Downer reported that the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) had made good progress in restoring law and order after escalating ethnic violence between 1998 and 2003 and that the country’s budget had been stabilised and its finances brought under control.⁹² After the murder of AFP officer Adam Dunning on 22 December 2004, Australia’s rapid deployment of a Ready Company Group of 100 soldiers provided security for police operations in 2004 and 2005. Despite RAMSI retaining strong support among both the public and then Solomon Islands prime minister Allan Kemakeza, several of his ministers resisted the appointment of an Australian as police commissioner.⁹³

Law enforcement cooperation in international cases carrying the death penalty created a tricky problem for Cabinet. The terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 and Bali in 2002 had spurred the Australian Government to cooperate with other countries on law enforcement, particularly on terrorism charges.⁹⁴ Australian authorities cooperated, for example, with Indonesia on its arrest of a group of Australian citizens – the so-called ‘Bali Nine’ – in April 2005. Two of the nine were sentenced to death by firing squad in 2015.⁹⁵

Providing for greater flexibility in enforcement cooperation raised a possible inconsistency in the government’s policy positions. On the one hand, the government aided foreign governments in pursuing Australians in crimes that might attract the death penalty in those countries. On the other hand, it lobbied against the implementation of death penalties. Cabinet ultimately agreed to provide mutual assistance where a person had been charged with an offence carrying the death penalty if the offender posed a terrorist threat to human life.⁹⁶

In the area of public diplomacy, Downer and Brendan Nelson, Minister for Education, Science and Training, proposed an umbrella scholarship program to advance Australia’s foreign policy and development agenda in the Asia-Pacific region.⁹⁷ The submission drew on the past successes in using scholarships to promote development and foster relationships between Australians and people of other countries. In this regard, the government was proudest of the Colombo Plan, which had run for about 30 years since the 1950s, benefitting about 40,000 people from developing countries.⁹⁸

The ministers proposed that AusAID’s Australian Development Scholarships and the Department of Education, Science and Training’s Endeavour Programme be scaled up. The new plan, tentatively called the ‘Florey Plan’, aimed to double the number of awards offered by Australia from 9,000 to 18,000.

Climate change, the environment and energy

In 2002 Cabinet had agreed to set up an Energy Task Force to report to its Energy Committee.⁹⁹ Following the work of both task force and committee, the government set out a comprehensive framework for energy in its Securing Australia’s Energy Future White Paper, released on 15 June 2004.¹⁰⁰

In 2005 Ian Macfarlane, Minister for Industry, Tourism and Resources, submitted a progress report on the implementation of the white paper, which had framed the debate on whether Australia should adopt nuclear energy without offering firm conclusions.¹⁰¹

Macfarlane also noted the dissatisfaction of the renewable energy sector with the government’s 2004 decision not to increase the size and duration of support provided under the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) first adopted in 2001.¹⁰² As renewable energy technologies remained uncompetitive against conventional generation, the wind industry was expected to be the most affected.¹⁰³

A more serious problem was business community uncertainty over the future of Australia’s greenhouse policies and measures and the differences between the Commonwealth and state and territory governments on climate policy. Treasury was the department most critical of the submission; it argued that the white paper did not ‘deliver a robust climate change strategy’ and that business considered that the existing approach to climate policy was unsustainable.¹⁰⁴ Treasury’s persistent criticism of climate policy would later contribute to Howard changing course and championing an emissions trading scheme at the 2007 election.¹⁰⁵

Senator Ian Campbell, Minister for the Environment, joined Downer in updating Cabinet on developments in climate change science and on Australia’s international strategy in climate change negotiations.¹⁰⁶ They indicated that there was clear scientific evidence that the climate was changing as Australian and international temperatures had increased during the late 20th century.¹⁰⁷ Australia, they argued, was more vulnerable to climate change than most developed countries, including the United States and many European countries. The dangers included more frequent and intense bushfires, reduced rainfall, pressure on water resources for cities and rural areas, and a negative impact on Australia’s agricultural production.¹⁰⁸

Australia signed but did not ratify the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which committed industrialised countries, but not developing ones, to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. The protocol came into force in February 2005, by which time international negotiations had begun for post-2012 arrangements.

The ministers’ submission supported principles for an international climate change strategy that was environmentally effective and economically efficient without imposing an unfair burden on Australia.¹⁰⁹ There was, however, little detail on how these principles would be achieved.

Campbell also reported to Cabinet on the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, Australia’s premier piece of environmental legislation. Through the protection of matters of national environmental significance, such as nationally threatened species, World and National Heritage places and the Commonwealth marine area, it determined the environmental basis on which major projects were assessed and, if approved, the environmental conditions under which they could proceed. Campbell proposed some changes, the key one being to remove the impost on business and industry resulting from the environmental approval process.¹¹⁰

Rural and regional affairs

In 2003 Cabinet had agreed that John Anderson, Minister for Transport and Regional Services, should bring forward a submission on the development of a framework to assess the effectiveness of a broad suite of programs affecting regional Australia. The framework was developed by Anderson’s department in conjunction with an inter-agency working group of other interested departments.

On 19 April 2005 Cabinet agreed that the Department of Transport and Regional Services should implement the framework that contained key performance indicators (KPI), annual program expenditure for regions and agency reports on the contribution of their programs relevant to KPIs.¹¹¹

A particularly important issue for rural and regional Australia, and for the National Party, was Liberal senator Helen Coonan’s submission on arrangements to ‘future-proof’ telecommunications services in non-metropolitan areas and to consolidate the government’s approach to providing adequate regional telecommunications services.¹¹² These arrangements proved crucial in securing the vote of Barnaby Joyce, a key National Party senator from Queensland, for parliamentary approval of the full sale of Telstra.¹¹³

The Australian Government provided a variety of support mechanisms to help deal with the ongoing drought in eastern Australia. Exceptional Circumstances (EC) assistance was the main support mechanism; it provided income support payments and business support (interest rate subsidies) to ensure that farmers would not be forced to leave the land due to exceptional short-term adverse events. The government had provided drought assistance to farmers to the tune of $638 million since 2001 and anticipated spending $1 billion by 2006–07. Warren Truss, Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, sought Cabinet’s agreement on a package of EC reforms to be pursued at the Primary Industries Ministerial Council on 14 April 2005.¹¹⁴

Truss made submissions in relation to 2 other key areas: livestock exports and wheat. On 22 March Cabinet agreed to his recommendation to resume exports of livestock to Saudi Arabia, which, prior to August 2003, was the largest market for Australian live sheep exports. After Saudi Arabia’s rejection of an Australian shipment in 2003, Cabinet had commissioned an inquiry into the livestock industry, headed by Dr John Keniry, who recommended a range of improvements throughout the supply chain to strengthen the regulation of the trade and improve the welfare of livestock.¹¹⁵

The submission on wheat concerned the government’s response to recommendations of an independent panel conducted in 2004 into the management and regulation of Australia’s wheat marketing arrangements by AWB (International) Limited, a grower owned and controlled company, and the Wheat Export Authority (WEA), which was established under the Wheat Marketing Act 1989 to administer regulatory functions formerly performed by the Australia Wheat Board (AWB). There had been ongoing criticism of the ‘single desk’ arrangements for wheat by the Productivity Commission, the National Competition Council and some industry organisations. The government agreed to support in principle the review’s recommendations, including retention of AWBI as manager of the single desk and WEA as regulator.¹¹⁶

In September 2005 Howard requested that Jim Lloyd, Minister for Local Government, Territories and Roads, bring forward a Cabinet submission on financial difficulties facing Norfolk Island and proposing future governance strategies and options for a possible Commonwealth response.¹¹⁷

A Financial Advisory Report commissioned by the Department of Transport and Regional Services concluded that, without a substantial new source of revenue, the Norfolk Island economy was unsustainable – and probably 18 months from insolvency. Cabinet agreed in principle to an extension of Commonwealth financial assistance to Norfolk Island under a governance model in which Norfolk Island would be aligned with mainland self-governing territories, but with Commonwealth having greater powers of intervention.¹¹⁸ Ten years later, Norfolk Island ceased to be a self-governing territory; its government was replaced by a local council and its residents would henceforward have to pay Australian tax.¹¹⁹

Indigenous affairs

There were 2 particularly important submissions on Indigenous matters in 2005: one concerned reform of the native title system and the other reform of Northern Territory land rights. By 2005 the native title system had evolved markedly since the High Court’s 1992 Mabo judgement. Despite amendments the Howard government had made to the Native Title Act 1993 in 1998, Philip Ruddock and Amanda Vanstone believed that resolving native title issues was still too costly and time-consuming.¹²⁰

Much of the total financial cost of native title was borne by the Commonwealth ($800 million since FY1997–98), whose future liability for compensation might possibly stretch back to 1901 for any dealings that involved acquisition of property by the Commonwealth on other than just terms.¹²¹ (This liability was later affirmed in a 2025 High Court judgement.)¹²²

The ministers submitted a package of reforms, including technical amendments to the Native Title Act 1993, reforms to encourage agreement-making in preference to litigation and a review of the role of the National Native Title Tribunal and the Federal Court of Australia in resolving claims under the native title system.¹²³

The context for Cabinet’s consideration of reform of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALR Act) was as follows. In 2005 Indigenous people owned approximately 20 per cent of Australia’s land under forms of title, including inalienable freehold, long-term leases and exclusive-possession native title. Generally, however, Indigenous people had enjoyed little economic return from the land. Vanstone’s department regarded the form of land tenure as a possible impediment to economic development; for example, owing to restrictions on transferring the land (that is, inalienability) or on title-holding arrangements (that is, communal rather than individual ownership).¹²⁴

In 2004 Cabinet had agreed to reform the ALR Act.¹²⁵ In 2005 Vanstone sought Cabinet support for a Northern Territory Government proposal for traditional owners to continue to hold freehold communal title, but voluntarily to agree to grant 99-year leases over township areas to a government entity. This entity would then issue subleases to individual tenants, home purchasers, businesses and government service providers.¹²⁶

Conclusion

John Howard’s emphatic election victory in 2004 gave the government freedom to embark on far-reaching but controversial industrial relations laws that echoed SM Bruce’s failed industrial relations reforms of 1929.¹²⁷ Labor Party and trade union campaigns beginning in 1929 and 2005 led to the eventual fall of long-standing conservative governments, and of 2 prime ministers (Bruce and Howard), both of whom lost their own seats.¹²⁸

In the remainder of its fourth term, the Howard government would also face repercussions from its 2003 Iraq commitment in the form of an investigation in 2006 of corruption in the grain marketing organisation, AWB.¹²⁹ Pressure was mounting too for a change of course on climate policy by promising to introduce an emissions trading scheme.¹³⁰ One longer-term consequence of the full privatisation of Telstra in 2006 was the obstacle that that put in the way of the decision in 2007 of the Howard government’s successor, the Rudd Labor government, to build a National Broadband Network (NBN).¹³¹

End notes

¹ John Howard, Lazarus rising: a personal and political autobiography, HarperCollins, Sydney, 2010, pp. 568–69.

²  See Liam Byrne, No power greater: a history of union action in Australia, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, VIC, 2025, Chapter 14.

³ Cabinet Submission JH05/0088 – Workplace Relations Reform: Strategic Directions – Cabinet Decision JH05/0088/CAB, 7 March 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/88/1.

⁴  Nicholas Aroney, ‘Constitutional choices in the Work Choices case, or what exactly is wrong with the Reserved Powers doctrine?’, Melbourne University Law Review, vol. 32, no. 1, 2008, https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2008/1.html; Bill Ford, ‘The corporatisation of Australian labour law: completing Howard’s unfinished business’, Australian Journal of Labour Law, vol. 19, no. 2, 2006, pp. 144–60, https://api.research-repository.uwa.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/462478….

⁵  Cabinet Decision JH05/0088/CAN/3, 30 March 2005, NAA: A14370, JH05/0088, p. 1.

⁶  Without Submission – Workplace Relations Reform – Cabinet Decision JH05/0045/CAB, 22 February 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/45.

⁷  ‘Howard’s workplace revolution’, The Age, 27 May 2005.

⁸  Carolyn Sutherland, Agreement-making under Work Choices: the impact of the legal framework on bargaining practices and outcomes, Office of the Workplace Rights Advocate, October 2007.

⁹  Kathie Muir, ‘“Your Rights at Work” campaign: Australia’s “most sophisticated political campaign”’, Labor History, vol. 51, no. 1, 2010, pp. 55–70; Ray Markey, ‘The ACTU is a key Labor supporter but how much power does it actually have?’, The Conversation, 10 June 2016.

¹⁰  Cabinet Submission JH05/0080 – Employment Services Purchasing Arrangements – 2006-2009 – Cabinet Decision JH05/0080/CAB, 12 April 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/80.

¹¹  Cabinet Submission JH05/0290 – Outcomes of the Various Studies into the Possible Sale of the Australian Government’s Remaining Shareholding in Telstra – Cabinet Decision JH05/0290/CAB, 16 August 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/290/1;Without Submission – Changes to the Sale Related Provisions of the Telstra (Transition to Private Ownership Bill 2005) – Cabinet Decision JH05/0290/CAB/2, 5 September 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/290/2; Cabinet Submission JH05/0284 – Telstra Price Controls – Cabinet Decision JH05/0284/CAB, 15 August 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/284/1; ‘Telstra Bill Sales Through’, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 September 2005.

¹²  See David Lee, ‘The 2004 cabinet records in context’, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, 2025.

¹³  Cabinet Submission JH05/0152 – Implementing the Future Fund – Cabinet Decision JH05/0152/CAB, 12 April 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/152.

¹⁴  Cabinet Submission JH05/0152 – Implementing the Future Fund – Cabinet Decision JH05/0152/CAB, 12 April 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/152; Xu Yi-Chong, ‘The Australian Future Fund’, in Douglas Cumming et al. (eds), The Oxford handbook of sovereign wealth funds, 2017, (online ed., Oxford Academic, 6 November 2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198754800.013.15.

¹⁵  David Marr, ‘The lady vanishes’, The Age, 23 June 2005.

¹⁶  Without Submission – Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Immigration Detention of Ms Cornelia Rau – Cabinet Decision JH05/0248/CAB, 12 July 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/248; ‘The regrettable case of Vivian Alvarez Solon’, The Age, 14 May 2005; ‘The lies that kept Vivian Alvarez hidden for years’, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 August 2005; Robert Manne, ‘The unknown story of Cornelia Rau’, The Monthly, September 2005.

¹⁷  Without Submission – Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Immigration Detention of Ms Cornelia Rau – Cabinet Decision JH05/0248/CAB, 12 July 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/248; ‘Rau treatment “demonstrably inadequate’’’, ABC News, 6 July 2005.

¹⁸ Cabinet Submission – Implementation of the Palmer Report Recommendations, Performance Improvements and Culture Change in the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs – Cabinet Decision JH05/0349/CAB, 4 October 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/349.

¹⁹  Cabinet Memorandum JH05/0142 – Targeting Skills Shortages with the Migration Program – NAA: A14370, JH2005/142.

²⁰  Cabinet Submission JH05/0069 – 2005–06 Migration (Non-Humanitarian) Program – Cabinet Decision JH05/0069/CAB/3, 12 April 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/69.

²¹  Cabinet Submission JH05/0070 – 2005–06 Humanitarian Program – Cabinet Decision JH05/0070/CAB, 14 March 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/70.

²²  Cabinet Submission JH05/0129 – Offshore Asylum Seeker Processing – Continuation of Manus (PNG) and Nauru Facilities – Cabinet Decision JH05/0129/CAB, 22 March 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/129.

²³  See David Lee, ‘The 2002 Cabinet papers in context’, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, 2003.

²⁴  Cabinet Submission JH05/0195 – Australia’s Engagement with Nauru: 2005–09 – Cabinet Decision JH05/0195/CAB, 14 June 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/195.

²⁵  Howard, Lazarus rising, p. 536; Without Submission – Welfare to Work – Cabinet Decision JH05/0036/CAB, 22 February 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/36; Anne-marie Boxall, ‘Private health insurance “carrot and stick” reforms have failed – here’s why’, The Conversation, 31 March 2015.

²⁶  ‘Treasurer targets Medicare safety net’, The Age, 2 April 2005.

²⁷  Cabinet Submission JH05/0098 – Medicare Safety Net – Cabinet Decision JH05/0098/CAB/2, 12 April 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/98, pp. 10–11.

²⁸  ‘Government breaks Medicare promise’, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 May 2005.

²⁹  Michelle Grattan, ‘In 2005 Abbott was forced to break his election word – this time it’s up to him’, The Conversation, 6 May 2014.

³⁰  Cabinet Submission JH05/0285 – Options to Increase the Value and Competitiveness of Private Health Insurance – Cabinet Decision JH05/0285/CAB, 15 August 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/285.

³¹  Cabinet Memorandum JH05/0100 – Proposal to Review the Effectiveness of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme – Cabinet Decision JH05/100/CAB/2, 12 April 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/100.

³²  ‘Patients to “benefit” from PBS changes’, ABC News, 16 November 2006.

³³  Cabinet Submission JH05/0138 – Increasing Generic Medicine Usage in Australia – decision of Expenditure Review Committee JH05/0138/ER, 29 March 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/138.

³⁴  Without Submission – Funding Options for Pregnancy Support Counselling – Cabinet Decision JH05/0481/CAB, 6 December 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/481.

³⁵  Cabinet Memorandum JH05/0465 – A National Approach to an Influenza Pandemic – Cabinet Decision JH05/0465/CAB, 6 December 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/465; Cabinet Submission JH05/0406 – International Dimensions of the Avian and Pandemic Influenza Threat and the Australian Response – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0406/NSC, 8 November 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/406; Cabinet Submission JH05/0087 – Immunisation Policy Structure – Cabinet Decision JH05/0087/CAB, 7 March 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/87.

³⁶  See David Lee, ‘Managing COVID’ in Scott Prasser (ed.), Tragedy without triumph: the Coalition in office 2013–2022, Connor Court, Redland Bay, Qld, pp. 159–79.

³⁷  ‘Report to Urge Nursing Home Bonds’, The Age, 17 September 2004.

³⁸  Cabinet Submission JH05/0482 – Longer Term Reform of Aged Care – Cabinet Decision JH05/0482/CAB, 12 December 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/482.

³⁹  Cabinet Submission JH05/0482 – Longer Term Reform of Aged Care – Cabinet Decision JH05/0482/CAB, 12 December 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/482. Attachment A: Coordination Comments, p. 12.

⁴⁰  Cabinet Submission JH05/0482 – Longer Term Reform of Aged Care – Cabinet Decision JH05/0482/CAB, 12 December 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/482.

⁴¹  Cabinet Memorandum JH05/0240 – Australian Technical Colleges: Assessment of Proposals – Cabinet Decision JH05/0240/CAB, 12 July 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/240.

⁴²  Alan D Gent, The rise and fall of an Australian Technical College program, Curtin University, Bentley, WA, 2019.

⁴³  Cabinet Submission JH05/0077 – 2005–06 Budget – Reducing Family Tax Overpayments and Debts – Decision of Expenditure Review Committee JH05/0077/ER/2, 30 March 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/77.

⁴⁴  Cabinet Submission JH05/0432 – The National Agenda for Early Childhood – Cabinet Decision JH05/0432/CAB, 12 December 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/432.

⁴⁵  Cabinet Submission JH05/0432 – The National Agenda for Early Childhood – Cabinet Decision JH05/0432/CAB, 12 December 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/432.

⁴⁶  Cabinet Submission JH05/0179 – Use of smart cards to improve Government service delivery – strategic discussion including opportunities and options – Cabinet Decision JH05/0179/CAB, 23 May 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/179; ‘Cabinet approves smart card’, ABC News, 26 April 2006.

⁴⁷  Nick O’Malley, ‘Wounds of the intervention still run deep’, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 June 2019.

⁴⁸  Cabinet Submission JH05/0106 – A New Approach to the Family Law System: Government Response to Every Picture Tells a Story – Cabinet Decision JH065/0106/CAB, 14 March 2005 – NAA: A14370, JH05/106.

⁴⁹  Cabinet Submission JH05/0153 – Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System – Cabinet Decision JH05/0153/CAB, 12 April 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/153.

⁵⁰  Cabinet Submission JH05/0153 – Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System – Cabinet Decision JH05/0153/CAB, 12 April 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/153; Howard, Lazarus rising, pp. 519–20.

⁵¹  Cabinet Submission JH05/0153 – Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System – Cabinet Decision JH05/0153/CAB, 12 April 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/153. Se also, Milovan Lucich, Nathan Dal Bon and Elisha Houston, ‘The Indonesian economy after the Boxing Day tsunami and Treasury’s role in the Government Partnership Fund’, Department of the Treasury, 4 September 2006; Ian Main, ‘Pacific tsunami: modern early warning systems prevent the catastrophic death tolls of the past’, The Conversation, 31 July 2025.

⁵²  Cabinet Submission JH05/0023 – Australia–Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development – Cabinet Decision JH05/0023/CAB, 7 February 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/23, p. 4.

⁵³  Cabinet Submission JH05/0023 – Australia–Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development – Cabinet Decision JH05/0023/CAB, 7 February 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/23.

⁵⁴  John Martinkus, Indonesia’s secret war in Aceh, Random House Australia, Sydney, 2011.

⁵⁵  Jamie Mackie, Australia and Indonesia: current problems, future prospects, Lowy Institute Paper No. 19, Lowy Institute, Double Bay, NSW, 2007; Josh Frydenberg, ‘Australia–Indonesia relations: a Coalition legacy’, ABC News, 18 February 2011.

⁵⁶  Cabinet Submission JH05/0221/CAB – Review of Australia’s Relationship with Indonesia – Cabinet Decision JH05/0221/CAB, 20 June 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/221.

⁵⁷  Cabinet Submission JH05/0242 – Options for a Defence Contribution to Afghanistan – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0242/NSC, 12 July 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/242.

⁵⁸  Rhys Crawley, Chapter 17: ‘Organising for operation: case studies from the Australian Defence Force’s Afghanistan commitments, 2005–2006’, in John Blaxland (ed.), Mobilising the Australian Army: contingencies and compromises over more than a century, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2025; pp. 368–86; Karen Middleton, An unwinnable war: Australia in Afghanistan, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, VIC, 2011.

⁵⁹  ‘Australia post defence attaché at NATO’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 April 2005.

⁶⁰  Cabinet Submission JH05/0242 – Options for a Defence Contribution to Afghanistan – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0242/NSC, 12 July 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/242, p. 3.

⁶¹ National Security Committee Decision JH05/0242/NSC, 12 July 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/242.

⁶²  Cabinet Submission JH05/0404 – CH-47D Aviation Element Deployment to Afghanistan – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0404/NSC, 8 November 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/404.

⁶³  Daniel Flitton, ‘Australia’s mission in Afghanistan – what was it again?’, The Interpreter, 20 November 2020.

⁶⁴  Cabinet Submission JH05/0324 – Enhancements to the Australian Defence Force Military Justice System – Cabinet Decision JH05/0324/CAB, 12 September 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/324.

⁶⁵  Without Submission – Al Muthanna Province, Iraq – Assisting in Provision of a Secure Environment for the Japanese Contingent/Training Element – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0440/NS/2, 16 February 2005 – NAA: A14370, JH2005/040.

⁶⁶  Cabinet Submission JH05/0416 – Middle East Area of Operations Force Level Review – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0416/NSC, 8 November 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/416. For context, see Thomas E Ricks, Fiasco: the American military adventure in Iraq, Penguin, New York, 2006.

⁶⁷  ‘Douglas Wood: former Iraq Hostage dies in Melbourne home’, Herald Sun, 3 January 2020.

⁶⁸  ‘Howard defies captors’ pullout demand’, Al Jazeera, 2 May 2005.

⁶⁹  Without Submission – Rescue of Douglas Wood in Iraq – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0233/NS, 15 June 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/233.

⁷⁰  Without Submission – Update on Iraq and Afghanistan – National Security Committee Minute, JH05/0491/NSC, 5 December 2005, NAA; A14370, JH2005/491.

⁷¹  Cabinet Submission JH05/0208 – 2005 United Nations Summit: Australian Interests – Cabinet Decision JH05/0208/CAB, 14 June 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/208; Cabinet Submission JH05/0042 – Report to Cabinet on Australian Government Support for Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games – February 2005 – Cabinet Decision JH05/0042/CAB, [February] 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/42; Without Submission – Multilateral Debt Relief to Poor Countries – Cabinet Decision JH05/0230/CAB, 14 June 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/230.

⁷²  Without Submission – Expanded Employment of Servicewomen in the Army – Cabinet Decision JH05/0295/CAB, 15 August 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/295.

⁷³  Cabinet Submission JH05/0163 – Arming the Australian Customs Service Vessels (ACV) – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0163/NS, 19 April 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/163.

⁷⁴  Cabinet Submission JH05/0076 – Managing the Defence Capability Plan (DCP) – Expenditure Review Committee Decision JH05/0076/ER, 9 March 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/76; Cabinet Memorandum JH05/0317 – Delivering the Defence Capability Plan – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0317/NSC, 7 September 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/317.

⁷⁵  Cabinet Submission JH05/0068 – 2005–06 Budget – Defence Portfolio Budget Submission – Cabinet Decision JH05/0068/CAB/2, 12 April 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/68.

⁷⁶  Cabinet Submission JH05/0160 – AIR 6000 – New Air Combat Capability – Entry into Negotiations for JSF Production, Sustainment and Follow-on Development – National Security Committee Decision JH05/160/NS, 19 April 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/160.

⁷⁷  Peter Layton, ‘Australia’s F-35s: Lessons from a problematic purchase’, The Interpreter, 11 November 2019.

⁷⁸  Cabinet Submission JH05/0448 – Australia’s National Security: Defence Update 2005 – National Security Committee Decision JH/05/0448/NSC, 20 November 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/448.

⁷⁹  Cabinet Submission JH05/0448 – Australia’s National Security: Defence Update 2005 – National Security Committee Decision JH/05/0448/NSC, 20 November 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/448. Attachment A: Coordination Comments, p. 6.

⁸⁰  Tariq Ali, Rough music: Blair, bombs, Baghdad, London, terror, Verso Books, London, 2005; Without Submission – Post-London Report – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0273/NSC, 9 August 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/273; Without Submission – Terrorist Attacks in Bali—October 2005 – National Security Decision JH05/0365/NSC, 4 October 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/365.

⁸¹  Cabinet Submission JH05/0489 – Initiatives to Address Extremism, Intolerance and the Promotion of Violence in the Community – Cabinet Decision JH05/0489/CAB, 12 December 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/489.

⁸²  Cabinet Submission JH05/0336 – Council of Australian Governments Meeting on Counter-Terrorism – September 2005 – Cabinet Decision JH05/0336/CAB/2, 20 September 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/336; Cabinet Submission JH05/0313 – Proposals for Strengthening Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Regime – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0313/NS, 7 September 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/313.

⁸³  Cabinet Submission JH05/0485 – Implementation of the Blunn Report on the review of Regulation of Access to Communications – Cabinet Decision JH05/0485/CAB, 12 December 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/485.

⁸⁴  Cabinet Submission JH05/0085 – Australia’s Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Agenda: 2005 – Cabinet Decision JH05/0085/CAB, 7 March 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/85.

⁸⁵  Cabinet Submission JH05/0225 – Australia–China Free Trade Agreement – Cabinet Decision JH05/0255/CAB, 20 June 2005, NAA: A14370, JH05/0225. ‘Howard leaves Beijing after snap visit’, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 April 2005; ‘Australia, China sign memorandum’, ABC News, 18 April 2005; Colleen Ryan, ‘Can John Howard conquer China?’, Australian Financial Review, 16 April 2005.

⁸⁶  Cabinet Submission JH05/0225 – Australia–China Free Trade Agreement – Cabinet Decision JH05/0225/CAB, 20 June 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/225.

⁸⁷  Cabinet Submission JH05/0217 – China: Mandate to Negotiate Bilateral Agreement on Uranium Exports -National Security Committee Decision JH05/0217/NS, 15 June 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/217.

⁸⁸  Cabinet Submission JH05/0031 – Papua New Guinea: Enhanced Cooperation Program: Update – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0031/NS, 15 February 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/31, p. 1.

⁸⁹  Cabinet Submission JH05/0276 – Papua New Guinea: Enhanced Cooperation Program – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0276/NSC, 9 August 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/276.

⁹⁰  Cabinet Submission JH05/0310 – Fiji: Political Stability and Australian Engagement – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0310/NSC, 7 September 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/310.

⁹¹  Cabinet Submission JH05/0310 – Fiji: Political Stability and Australian Engagement – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0310/NSC, 7 September 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/310.

⁹²  Cabinet Submission JH05/0029 – Solomon Islands: RAMSI Update February 2005 – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0029/NS, 15 February 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/29.

⁹³  Cabinet Submission JH05/0029 – Solomon Islands: RAMSI Update February 2005 – National Security Committee Decision JH05/0029/NS, 15 February 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/29.

⁹⁴  See David Lee, ‘The 2002 Cabinet papers in context’, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, 2023, and David Lee, ‘The 2003 Cabinet papers in context’, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, 2024.

⁹⁵  Kate Lamb, ‘A year after the Bali Nine executions, Indonesia prepares firing squads again’, The Guardian, 28 April 2016; Amy Maguire and Shelby Houghton, ‘The Bali Nine, capital punishment and Australia’s obligation to seek abolition’, Current Issues in Criminal Justice, vol. 28, no. 1, 2016, pp. 67–91: https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/CICrimJust/2016/13.html.

⁹⁶  Cabinet Submission JH05/0207 – The Death Penalty and International Law Enforcement Cooperation – Cabinet Decision JH05/0207/CAB, 14 June 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/207.

⁹⁷  Cabinet Submission JH05/0360 – The Florey Plan – Cabinet Decision JH05/0360/CAB, 10 October 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/360.

⁹⁸ Daniel Oakman, Facing Asia: a history of the Colombo Plan, ANU Press, Canberra, 2004; David Lowe, The Colombo Plan: development internationalism in Cold War Asia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2025.

⁹⁹ See David Lee, ‘The 2004 Cabinet papers in context’, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, 2025.

¹⁰⁰ David Lee, ‘The 2004 Cabinet papers in context’, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, 2025.

¹⁰¹  Cabinet Submission JH05/0425 – Progress of Implementation of Energy White Paper Measures – Cabinet Decision JH05/0425/CAB, 28 November 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/425.

¹⁰²  See David Lee, ‘The 2004 cabinet records in context’, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, 2025.

¹⁰³  Cabinet Submission JH05/0425 – Progress of Implementation of Energy White Paper Measures – Cabinet Decision JH05/0425/CAB, 28 November 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/425.

¹⁰⁴  Cabinet Submission JH05/0425 – Progress of Implementation of Energy White Paper Measures – Cabinet Decision JH05/0425/CAB, 28 November 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/425. Attachment A: Coordination Comments, p. 11.

¹⁰⁵  Shane Wright, ‘Why John Howard intervened to kill the emissions trading scheme his cabinet wanted’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 January 2024; Christopher Rootes, ‘The first climate change election? The Australian general election of 24 November 2007’, Environmental Politics, vol. 17, no. 3, 2008, pp. 473–80.

¹⁰⁶  Cabinet Submission JH05/0258 – Climate Change: International Developments and Australia’s Post 2012 Strategy – Cabinet Decision JH05/0258/CAB, 8 August 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/258.

¹⁰⁷  Cabinet Submission JH05/0258 – Climate Change: International Developments and Australia’s Post 2012 Strategy – Cabinet Decision JH05/0258/CAB, 8 August 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/258.

¹⁰⁸  Cabinet Submission JH05/0258 – Climate Change: International Developments and Australia’s Post 2012 Strategy – Cabinet Decision JH05/0258/CAB, 8 August 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/258.

¹⁰⁹  Cabinet Submission JH05/0258 – Climate Change: International Developments and Australia’s Post 2012 Strategy – Cabinet Decision JH05/0258/CAB, 8 August 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/258.

¹¹⁰  Cabinet Submission JH05/0407 – Optimising the Operation of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 – Cabinet Decision JH05/0407/CAB, 9 November 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/407.

¹¹¹  Cabinet Submission 2nd Amended JH05/0110 – Implementation of a National Regional Evaluation Framework – Cabinet Decision JH05/0110/CAB, 19 April 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/110.

¹¹²  Cabinet Submission JH05/0280 – Future Proofing Regional, Rural and Remote Telecommunications – Cabinet Decision JH05/0280/CAB/2, 5 September 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/280.

¹¹³  ‘Senate approves full Telstra’ sale’, ABC News, 14 September 2005; ‘Barnaby clears the way for Telstra sale’, Sydney Morning Herald, 25 August 2005.

¹¹⁴  Cabinet Submission JH05/0120 – Exceptional Circumstances (EC) Policy Reform – Cabinet Decision JH05/01220/CAB, 22 March 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/120/1.

¹¹⁵  Cabinet Submission JH05/0096 – Review of Livestock Export Trade and possible Resumption of Exports to Saudi Arabia – Cabinet Decision JH05/0096/CAB, 22 March 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/96; ‘Saudi, Aust livestock trade resumes’, ABC News, 4 May 2005.

¹¹⁶  Cabinet Submission JH05/0097 – 2004 Wheat Marketing Review – Cabinet Decision JH05/0097/CAB, 22 March 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/97.

¹¹⁷  Cabinet Submission JH05/0454 – Norfolk Island Future Governance – Cabinet Decision JH05/0454/CAB, 6 December 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/454.

¹¹⁸  Cabinet Submission JH05/0454 – Norfolk Island Future Governance – Cabinet Decision JH05/0454/CAB, 6 December 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/454.

¹¹⁹  Shalailah Medhora, ‘Norfolk Island self-government to be replaced by local council’, The Guardian, 19 March 2015.

¹²⁰  Cabinet Submission JH05/0256 – Native Title System Reform – Cabinet Decision JH05/0256/CAB, 5 September 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/256.

¹²¹  David Lee, ‘Gove and the native title revolution’, Pearls and Irritations, 28 March 2025.

¹²²  Nino Bucci and Sarah Collard, ‘High Court native title ruling may affect compensation claims nationwide, experts say’, The Guardian, 14 March 2025.

¹²³  Cabinet Submission JH05/0281 – Further Reform of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 – Leasing and Other Issues – Cabinet Decision JH05/0281/CAB, 5 September 2005 – NAA: A14370, JH2005/281.

¹²⁴  Cabinet Submission JH05/0256 – Native Title System Reform – Cabinet Decision JH05/0256/CAB, 5 September 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/256.

¹²⁵  See David Lee, ‘The 2004 cabinet records in context’, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, 2025.

¹²⁶  Cabinet Submission JH05/0281 – Further Reform of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 – Leasing and Other Issues – Cabinet Decision JH05/0281/CAB, 5 September 2005 – NAA: A14370, JH2005/281.

¹²⁷  David Lee, Stanley Melbourne Bruce: Australian internationalist, Bloomsbury, London and New York, 2010, Chapter 6.

¹²⁸  Tim Johnston, ‘Australians oust Howard after 4 terms’, New York Times, 24 November 2007.

¹²⁹  Cabinet Submission JH05/0162 – National Interest Account (NIA) Facility for Exports to Iraq – Cabinet Decision JH/05/0162/CAB, 19 April 2005, NAA: A14370, JH2005/162.

¹³⁰  ‘Howard announces emissions trading scheme’, ABC News, 17 July 2007; Caroline Overington, Kickback: inside the Australian Wheat Board scandal, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2007.

¹³¹  Andrew Leigh, ‘The risks of privatised monopolies – protecting the NBN’, Speech, House of Representatives, 20 November 2024; John Quiggin, ‘NBN: we would have been better off without privatisation’, The Guardian, 21 August 2013.